This chapter reviews empirical evidence on the micro-level consequences of family planning programs in middle-and low-income countries. In doing so, it focuses on fertility outcomes (the number and timing of births), women's health and socio-economic outcomes (mortality, human capital, and labor force participation), and children's health and socioeconomic outcomes throughout the life cycle. Though effect sizes are heterogeneous, long-term studies imply that in practice, family planning programs may only explain a small share of fertility decline in real-world settings. Family planning programs may also have quantitatively modestbut practically meaningful -effects on the socio-economic welfare of individuals and families.
Introduction
The twentieth century witnessed the birth of modern 'family planning' and its evolution from an early target of anti-obscenity laws (Comstock, 1873) to a focus of global efforts to improve human welfare (Cleland et al., 2006) . 1 Many observers date the modern family planning movement to the famous 1916 opening of New York City's first birth control clinic. Mid-century, the International Planned Parenthood Federation and the Population Council were instrumental in both the development of modern contraceptive technologies (including the first oral contraceptive, Enovid, and plastic intrauterine devices) and in promoting their widespread distribution, ushering in the 'modern' era of fertility control.
Heightened concern about world's unprecedented rate of population growth (and its potential macroeconomic and environmental consequences) also arose mid-century (Coale and Hoover (1959) were active in 115 countries (Cleland et al., 2006) . Remarkably, the total fertility rate in developing countries also fell by more than half over this period (Sinding, 2007) .
Academics have long debated the primary forces responsible for global fertility decline -and in particular, the contribution made by family planning (Kaiser, 2011) . One view largely credits family planning programs directly (Bongaarts et al., 1990 , Robey et al., 1993 . Others give them less credit, arguing that fertility decline is a response to economic development and industrialization, even if aided by family planning programs (Becker, 1960 , Davis, 1967 , Voigtlander and Voth, 2013 . A third view, promoted in part by the European Fertility Project, emphasizes the importance of social networks that facilitated the diffusion of 'cultural innovations' including the social acceptability of small families (Coale and Watkins, 1986) . 2 Finally, some propose that falling mortality rates play a central role (Palloni and Rafalimanana, 1999) .
As dire predictions about Malthusian demographic catastrophe failed to materialize (Lam, 2011) , population policy became more nuanced during the 1980s and 1990s (Kelley, 2003) . 3 Stances on the relationship between population growth and economic development became more neutral (Finkle and Crane, 1985) , changing the motivation for family planning programs. 4 At the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, macroeconomic rationales for population policy were replaced with feminist, rights-based frameworks. Family planning programs were 2 The European Fertility Project's methodology and key findings have also been called into question (Brown and Guinnane, 2003) . 3 Many scholars question whether or not alarmism over population growth is justified generally. Some argue that population growth strengthens incentives for technological progress capable of averting Malthusian calamity (Boserup, 1965 , Simon, 1981 . A famous wager between Paul Ehrlich and Julian Simon illustrates this point. In 1980, Simon bet Ehrlich that the price of any five commodity metals chosen by Ehrlich (chromium, copper, nickel, tin, and tungsten) would decline over the subsequent decade (rather than rise). Commodity metals exist in fixed supply, while population growth raises demand for them, all else equal -exerting upward pressure on prices. However, in response to rising prices, technological progress (in industrial processes, etc.) also leads to substitution away from them, placing downward pressure on prices. By 1990, the inflation-adjusted price of all five metals had fallen. 4 Recognition of the importance of population age structure, not just population size and growth, grew during this period -on the 'demographic dividend,' see Bloom and Williamson (1998) , Bloom, Canning et al. (2003) , and Bloom and Canning (2009). recast to emphasize individual needs and desires, stressing socio-economic and health benefits for women their families .
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In the spirit of contemporary emphasis on broad, individual-level benefits, this chapter reviews empirical evidence on the micro-level consequences of family planning programs in middle-and low-income countries. In doing so, it focuses on three types of outcomes: (1) fertility outcomes (the number and timing of births), (2) women's health and socio-economic outcomes (mortality, human capital, and labor force participation), and (3) children's health and socio-economic outcomes throughout the life cycle.
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The remainder of this review is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes background debate about the relative importance of supply-vs. demand-side factors in explaining fertility decline. The third section reviews empirical studies of the relationship between family planning programs and fertility outcomes, while the fourth covers program effects on health and socio-economic outcomes among women and their children. Pooling across studies, the fifth section concludes by summarizing ranges of estimates that emerge from the empirical literature. Overall, family planning programs may explain only a small share of the fertility decline in real-world settings, but it may also have meaningful effects on the socio-economic welfare of individuals and families.
2. Background Controversy: Supply vs. Demand and the Pritchett (1994) Critique 5 As the definition of reproductive health expanded, so did the scope of family planning programsgrowing to encompass safe delivery, prevention and treatment of sexually-transmitted infections, safe abortion, and violence against women (Greene and Merrick, 2005) . 6 Many studies estimate the impact of family planning programs on contraceptive use and knowledge, but because modern contraceptives may substitute for traditional methods of birth control (prolonged breastfeeding, rhythm, and postpartum abstinence, for example), indirectly inferring effects on fertility and socio-economic outcomes is complex (Schultz, 1992) . Similarly, given debate about the influence of family planning programs on the number, timing, and spacing of births, we omit studies that simply relate the number, timing, and spacing of births to downstream socio-economic outcomes.
Among the competing explanations for fertility decline described above, an (Rogers et al., 1999) , Rwanda (Westoff, 2013) , and China (Hesketh and Zhu, 1997) . The debate also distinguishes "distal" and "proximate" causes of fertility decline. We do not emphasize this distinction because behaviors that change when a key constraint to reproductive behavior is relaxed are by definition "proximate," regardless of whether they reflect demand or supply. 8 Except in the implausible case that demand is perfectly price elastic Across three different measures of desired fertility (or the demand for children), the paper establishes a nearly one-to-one correspondence between a country's total fertility rate and the number of children that women report wanting (regression coefficients range from 0.78 to 0.95 -with a positive constant of about 1-1.5). 9 Pritchett
argues that these relationships demonstrate the primacy of demand and that contraceptive supply has little influence on a country's total fertility rate. 10 He then addresses concerns about ex post rationalization and about the dependence of desired fertility on contraceptive availability using two related instrumental variables (IV) methodologies.
First, he uses the proportion of women with four children who desire no more (a forwardlooking statistic free of ex-post rationalization) to instrument for a retrospective measure of the demand for children fertility (DTFR). Second, he uses a retrospective measure of demand (DTFR) to instrument for a forward-looking measure (WTFR). The resulting instrumental variables estimates are again close to one, which Pritchett interprets to strengthen the conclusion that women are essentially able to have the number of children that they want -and contraceptive supply can at best explain 10% of the cross-country variation in fertility rates.
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9 Pritchett (1994) uses three measures of desired fertility contained in the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS): Average Ideal Number of Children (AINC), which is calculated directly from survey questions about women's ideal family size; the Desired Total Fertility Rate (DTFR), which is calculated from "agespecific birth rates after subtracting from the number of actual births those prior births that exceed each woman's reported desired family size;" and the Wanted Total Fertility Rate (WTFR), which is calculated using age-specific birth rates after subtracting births determined to be unwanted according to reported desire for future children . 10 Pritchett also makes three additional arguments for why contraceptive costs are unlikely to influence the number of children that women say they want: (1) DHS surveys are designed to elicit information about desired fertility at zero contraceptive cost, (2) evidence from the Matlab family planning experiment suggests that the stated number of desired children is not related to contraceptive availability, and (3) contraceptive costs are very small relative to the total cost of having and raising a child. 11 This relationship is generally robust to controlling for contraceptive prevalence (coefficient estimates for DTFR and WTFR decrease from 0.89 to 0.74 and from 0.91 to 0.77, respectively). The rationale for controlling for contraceptive prevalence is unclear, however, given that it captures demand as well as supply.
Pritchett's approach requires two important assumptions that we highlight. 12 The first is that the share of women in a country who have a given number of children and report not wanting more is unrelated to the country's total fertility rate except through desired fertility (demand). When answering questions about wanting more children, if women have in mind the costs of fertility control that they actually face in practice (despite survey instructions to the contrary), this assumption would be violated. 13 These costs may be difficult for respondents to disregard -the interpersonal costs that women face in bargaining over fertility with their partners, for example. The second related assumption is that past and current/future costs of fertility control are uncorrelated.
Because such a correlation is plausible, current/future costs of fertility control could in fact be related to past fertility decisions. Ultimately, these assumptions are not directly testable.
On a more general level, Pritchett argues that the financial cost of modern contraceptives is too small relative to the importance of fertility decisions to exert meaningful influence. However, these costs may nonetheless be prohibitive for poor households facing tight credit or liquidity constraints, and importantly, the total cost of fertility control extends far beyond the financial cost of contraceptives -bargaining with spouses over fertility and direct disutility from using of contraceptive devices, for example -and some empirical evidence suggests that these costs may be substantial. On bargaining, Ashraf et al. (2014) show that among the subset of couples with different fertility preferences, offering vouchers for contraceptives to women privately is 12 These two related assumptions are required for the validity of the IV strategy's 'exclusion restriction' (Angrist and Krueger, 1991) . 13 Pritchett (1994) argues that all female DHS respondents should have costless fertility control in mind; all that the IV strategy really requires is that women have the same cost of fertility control in mind (regardless of their magnitude).
significantly more effective than offering vouchers to them in the presence of their husbands (reducing unwanted births by 57%). On the direct disutility of modern contraceptives, research on commercial sex markets suggests that men are willing to pay 23% more for sex without a condom (and double that for unprotected sex with attractive commercial sex workers) (Gertler et al., 2005) .
Despite some unresolved concerns with Pritchett's (1994) analysis, its overarching point -that the demand for children may be more important than supply-side factors (including contraceptive supply) in determining fertility -may nonetheless stand.
Important determinants of the demand for children studied in the empirical literature on fertility include infant and child mortality rates (Angeles, 2010 , Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002 , Schultz, 1985 , the opportunity cost of time (both generally and for women) (Breierova and Duflo, 2004 , Lavy and Zablotsky, 2011 , Schultz, 1985 , anticipated increases in future demand for human capital (Galor and Weil, 2000) , and women's bargaining power within households (Rasul, 2008) . 14 3. Family Planning Programs and the Number, Timing, and Spacing of Births
The empirical literature on family planning is vast. To aid in our review, we used a strategy akin to the 'systematic review' methodology in the biomedical sciences, although we emphasize that we did not undertake a formal systematic review. Using explicit criteria to search four major databases of indexed journals (together with a 'snowball' approach), our initial search yielded 9,501 studies for consideration. We then reviewed abstracts, applying inclusion criteria for methodological rigor, 15 direct analysis of family planning program effects in developing countries, and an explicit focus on at least one of our three types of primary outcomes. Our final list includes 28 studies meeting these criteria.
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Randomized Controlled Trials
Arguably the most prominent study of family planning conducted to date is the famous Matlab family planning experiment. Beginning in 1977, the experiment randomly assigned 141 villages in Matlab, Bangladesh to either the study's 'treatment' arm (70) or a control arm (71). In treatment villages, female reproductive health workers visited the homes of married women of childbearing age every two weeks to educate women about reproductive health, provide nutrition counseling, and offer modern contraceptives free of charge. Maternal and child health services were integrated into the experimental treatment in 1982 (Muhuri, 1995) , and safe motherhood services followed (Chowdhury et al., 2009 ).
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The Matlab experiment has produced a large volume of academic papers. Early papers report a 25% reduction in the general fertility rate (GFR) over the first two years of the experiment (Phillips et al., 1982) , and these reductions lasted throughout the 1980s (Foster and Roy, 1997, Koenig et al., 1992) . Longer term follow-up suggests that these fertility effects persisted for at least 20 years, reducing the number of children ever born by 1-1.5 children and extending birth intervals by 8-13 months (Joshi and Schultz, 2007) .
Estimates of implied lifetime fertility reductions range from 13% (Sinha, 2005) to 23% (Joshi and Schultz, 2013) .
The Matlab experiment has also generated debate. First, critics note that the intensity and expense of the program would be unrealistic on a large scale. In its first 10 years, program costs were approximately $180 per birth averted (120% of Bangladesh's GDP per capita in 1987) (Simmons et al., 1991) -nearly 10 times more than mean family planning spending in developing countries at the time (Pritchett, 1994 ). Second, bundling child health services into the family planning treatment effectively reduced the 'price' of child survival -and could have therefore exerted independent influence on fertility (Becker, 1991 , Caldwell, 1976 , Sah, 1991 . Third, Schultz (2009) suggests possible deviations from true randomization in the experiment's implementation.
There are few other randomized controlled trials of family planning services. The Navrongo experiment in Ghana studied 37 communities randomized across four treatment arms (Binka et al., 1995 , Phillips et al., 2006 . Although balance across arms was not achieved, treatment arms combining family planning service training and community outreach were associated with a 15% reduction in the total fertility rate among married women (Debpuur et al., 2002 , Phillips et al., 2006 . Effects on parity progression persisted for 15 years (and have largely been attributed to the promotion of contraceptive use through community organizations) but have declined over time (Phillips et al., 2006 , Phillips et al., 2012 . Two other experiments integrated family planning services into existing programs: a microcredit program in Ethiopia (Desai and Tarozzi, 2011) and an HIV treatment program in Kenya (Kosgei et al., 2011) . Both experiments find null results in the first few years following implementation.
Observational studies
Two influential observational studies analyze contemporaneous effects of Indonesian National Family Planning Coordinating Board's programs during the late 1970s and 1980s. Gertler and Molyneaux (1994) combine birth history data with community-level information about family planning program activity to study program effects on community-level birth hazards between 1982 and 1987. Accounting for changes in the demand for children and community fixed effects, the authors show that family planning programs account for just 4-8% of Indonesia's decline in fertility (a 1-2% reduction in the monthly birth hazard) during the study period (Gertler and Molyneaux, 1994) . Relatedly, using both survey and population census data and explicitly modeling village-level family planning program placement, (Pitt et al., 1993) fail to find that the program had any significant effect on fertility between 1976 and 1986.
Also estimating short-run program effects, two additional studies use strategies that exploit program variation due to idiosyncratic public finance rules governing local government resource allocation. Specifically, Molyneaux and Gertler (2000) find that family planning subsidies were associated with 3-6% lower 
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Three studies by Angeles, Guilkey, and Mroz also use spatial and temporal variation in program exposure to estimate long-run effects on cumulative fertility. In Tanzania and Peru, the authors use random effects models to estimate the relationship between community-level program placement and individual birth hazards over two decades. They find 25-35% reductions in children ever born in Peru (Angeles et al., 2005a ) and 10-20% reductions in Tanzania, reporting that half of these effects is linked to program exposure during adolescence (Angeles et al., 1998) . In Indonesia, the authors model both indirect and direct pathways through which family planning might influence a woman's lifetime fertility. Jointly estimating equations for educational attainment, marriage, and fertility, they find that the long term presence of family planning programs is associated with a 20% reduction in completed fertility (or about one child) (Angeles et al., 2005b) .
Another set of studies examines the role of family planning in Iran's striking fertility decline during the 1980s and 1990s (as Iran's total fertility rate declined from over 7 births per woman to about 2 (Hashemi and Salehi-Isfahani, 2013) . Family planning was banned at the time of the Islamic Revolution, but in 1989, Iran abruptly legalized modern contraceptives and launched family planning programs through its large, pre-existing cadre of community health workers (Behvarz). Salehi-Isfahani (2010) combine data from the Iranian Ministry of Health with population census records from 1986 and 1996; using a difference-in-difference approach to study variation in the timing and location of community health worker activity, they find a 4% decline in the child to woman ratio associated with program activity, explaining 8-20% of the decline during the study period. Analyzing age-specific program exposure among cohorts of women in the 2006 Iranian census, Modrek and Ghobadi (2011) find an 18% reduction in children ever born among women first exposed to family planning between ages 20 and 34 and a 28% reduction among women first exposed between ages 15 and 19. Using a similar approach, Hashemi and Salehi-Isfahani (2013) report that the presence of a program was associated with a 5-7% increase in birth spacing.
Finally, a recent group of studies examines the short-run consequences of unanticipated 'shocks' to family planning programs. We note that the interpretation of these papers' estimates is complex because longer-term fertility behavior (which may offset the consequences of short-lived shocks) is not observed. In Eastern Europe, where abortion was historically the predominant form of fertility regulation, many countries limited or banned abortion during the 1980s and 1990s. 19 Examining the abrupt end of Romania's ban on abortion and family planning in 1989, Pop-Eleches (2010) uses survey data on births among reproductive age women two years before and after the end of the ban to employ a single difference approach (akin to a regression discontinuity design).
The author finds that lifting the ban was associated with a 30% decline in fertility -and conducting simulations using his estimates, he suggests that the cumulative effect of the Beyond their impact on fertility, family planning programs may also have important health and socioeconomic benefits for mothers and their children (Canning and Schultz, 2012) . Intuitively, these benefits could stem from changes in the number, 19 Levine and Staiger (2004) conduct a cross-country study of these abortion policy changes, finding that on average, restrictive policies led to a 17% higher birth rate (compared to a liberal policy). 20 Although complete data is not available for all study years, Jones also reports that the policy was associated with an immediate decline of roughly 40% in family planning funding and a 13% reduction in contraceptive supply.
timing, and spacing of births or from changes in sibship size and composition -but isolating the specific mechanisms or pathways through which they are produced is often not possible. Studying these benefits is also difficult because some do not emerge for many years, requiring long study periods.
21
Benefits among Mothers
Given high maternal mortality rates in many low-and middle-income countries, reductions in the number of births may mechanically reduce maternal mortality rates simply by reducing the number of times women are at risk of maternity-related death (Rahman and Menken, 2012) . However, if family planning programs also selectively reduce the relative incidence of riskier pregnancies (such as higher parity births), they may also reduce the maternal mortality ratio (Cleland et al., 2012 , Jain, 2011 , Winikoff and Sullivan, 1987 .
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Few studies analyze the direct relationship between family planning programs and maternal mortality. One exception is an early study of the Matlab experiment reporting that the maternal mortality rate in treatment areas declined to about half of the rate in control areas between 1976 and 1985 (Koenig et al., 1988) . However, this treatment 21 A large literature in development economics studies the relationship between these dimensions of fertility and the well-being of women and children (see Schultz, 2007) . We restrict our review to direct analyses of family planning programs. See the accompanying electronic appendix (at the time of writing this review, available at www.stanford.edu/~ngmiller) for details. 22 The maternal mortality rate measures the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 women of reproductiveage; the maternal mortality ratio measures the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. The medical literature suggests that nulliparous and grand multiparous births (first births and births of parity higher than five) may be riskier , Ezegwui et al., 2013 , for example). The evidence on elevated risk associated with 'unwanted' births, births to younger mothers, and short interval births is more tenuous (see Tsui et al. (2010) , DaVanzo, Razzaque et al. (2005) , and Conde-Agudelo and Belizan (2000) for example).
effect was due to relative declines in fertility -there was no change in the maternal mortality ratio (and hence no change in average mortality risk conditional on pregnancy).
Among surviving women, long-term studies of the Matlab experiment find anthropometric gains associated with the treatment. 23 Canning and Schultz (2012) report that in 1996, reproductive-age women in treatment areas had a 1 kg/m 2 higher Body Mass Index (BMI) than women in control areas. Adjusting for characteristics of women and their households, Joshi and Schultz (2013) find that this BMI advantage among women in treatment villages is only present at older ages. However, they also find that women in treatment areas are roughly 2kg heavier on average and are less likely to be underweight (defined as BMI<18 kg/m 2 ). 24 In interpreting these findings, we emphasize that improvements in women's health could be due to bundling of women's health services into the family planning 'treatment' beginning in 1982.
By allowing women greater control over the number, timing, and spacing of births, family planning programs may also influence their educational attainment, labor force participation, and lifetime earnings (Greene and Merrick, 2005) . 25 Studying Colombia, Miller (2010) reports that the presence of a local family planning program early in women's reproductive years is associated with a 1% increase in educational attainment (0.05 years of schooling) and a 4-7% increase in the likelihood formal sector 23 Selective mortality may bias anthropometric estimates downwards if marginal survivors are weaker (or have lower anthropometric indicators) than the average woman. 24 These BMI and weight differences could potentially imply differences in future survival; studying Matlab, Menken, Duffy et al. (2003) report that a one point increase in BMI is associated with a 17% decline in mortality hazard. 25 Although not well-developed theoretically or empirically, some authors suggest that family planning programs could potentially influence women's bargaining power within households and the status of women generally. For example, one study finds that home visits by family planning service providers may enhance women's social standing (Phillips and Hossain, 2003) .
employment (1-2 percentage points). 26 Using simulations, Angeles and coauthors (2005b) report larger effects on educational attainment in Indonesia, suggesting that lifetime exposure to family planning programs is associated with gains of 25-27% (or an additional 1.3 years of schooling).
Benefits among Children
Family planning programs could also influence children's health and socioeconomic outcomes through a variety of mechanisms (through changes in birth spacing and sibship size or through gains in women's educational attainment, for example).
Although a large literature links various dimensions of fertility to child welfare (DaVanzo et al., 2005 , Molyneaux and Gertler, 2000 , Rutstein, 2005 , few studies focus directly on family planning programs.
Studying child survival, two experiments find that family planning programs are associated with substantial reductions in child mortality under the age of five (decreases between 30% and 50%) (Joshi and Schultz, 2007 , Joshi and Schultz, 2013 , Phillips et al., 2006 . However, we emphasize that these programs bundled family planning services together with other health services -and in particular, ones targeting infant and child health, making it difficult to isolate the contribution of family planning services per se.
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Focusing more directly on family planning services alone, Miller (2010) and Portner, Beegle, and Christiaensen (2011) report no significant program effects on infant and child mortality.
26 Although beyond the scope of this review, studies of the United States mid-century find a relationship between the availability of modern contraceptives and both women's educational attainment and earnings (Goldin and Katz, 2002 , Bailey, 2006 , Bailey et al., 2012 . 27 Some research suggests that much of the reduction in child mortality in both Bangladesh and Ghana may have been due to child health and vaccinations programs (Koenig et al., 1990 , Phillips et al., 2006 .
Several other studies examine anthropometric measures of child health. 28 Joshi and Schultz (2007) report that girls in Matlab's treatment villages have BMI z-scores that are 0.4 standard deviations larger on average than those of their control village counterparts. Studying children in the Philippines, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1986) use longitudinal data to estimate within-child changes in anthropometrics associated with the share of a child's life for which family planning services were available (accounting for both regional and family characteristics potentially correlated with birth spacing). They find that lifetime exposure to family planning is associated with a 7% gain in child height and a 12% gain in child weight.
Beyond child health, family planning may benefit children in other ways throughout their lifetime, too -by increasing parents' investments in their education, for example (Becker, 1991) . Evidence on the direct relationship between family planning programs and children's educational attainment is again thin, however, and limited to long-term studies of the Matlab experiment. Foster and Roy (1997) report that the Matlab treatment increased both girls' and boys' years of completed schooling (by 6-15%
and 5-12%, respectively), an effect they link to reductions in sibship size. Joshi and Schultz (2007) find that relative to their peers in control villages, gains in educational attainment of 0.5 standard deviations persisted among boys (but not girls) in treatment villages.
Finally, a study of Romania's 1966 ban of abortion and family planning services compares cohorts born just after the ban (which include additional 'unwanted' children) with cohorts born just before it (Pop-Eleches, 2006) . Controlling for family characteristics, children born after the ban were less likely to complete either high school or college (by 1.7% and 1.4%, respectively) and were instead 2.1% more likely to complete a lower-return vocational degree. The paper attributes these changes in educational outcomes not only to the 'wantedness' of children, but also to crowding in schools among post-ban birth cohorts (the role of sibship size is not explicitly studied) (Pop-Eleches, 2006).
Conclusion
This chapter reviews empirical studies of family planning programs in developing countries, focusing on fertility and on the health and socio-economic welfare of women and children. Because the family planning literature is vast, we used an informal approach akin to the 'systematic review' methodology in the biomedical sciences in an effort both to be comprehensive and to explicitly define our focus.
Pooling across studies, we propose several generalizations about family planning program effects. First, we find that program effects on fertility vary between 5% and 35% fewer children ever born and 5-7% longer birth spacing (see Table 1 for a summary). Estimates from the famous Matlab experiment generally fall in the upper-end of this range -but we note that the experimental intervention is likely too intensive to be replicated on large scale, limiting the generalizability of its results -and they also presumably reflect reductions attributable to other health services bundled into the experimental treatment. Long-term studies of real-world programs yield more modest effect sizes, implying that in practice, family planning programs may only explain about 8% of fertility decline in real-world settings. Overall, it is difficult to argue that family planning programs alone explain a large share of the fertility decline in developing countries over the past half-century. Demand-side factors may play a more important role Molyneaux, 1994, Pritchett, 1994) Second, we find evidence that family planning programs may have quantitatively modest -but practically meaningful -effects on the socio-economic welfare of individuals and families. Excluding studies of family planning programs that bundle maternal and child health services into their service packages, there is little evidence about program effects on maternal and child health outcomes. However, long-term studies of socio-economic outcomes suggest that family planning programs may raise educational attainment among women (by 1%-30%) and among children (by 5-18%).
Although socio-economic effects at the bottom end of these ranges may seem small, we note that they are not dissimilar in magnitude to gains associated with programs explicitly aiming to boost educational attainment. Column 4 reports the change in fertility associated with a one unit change in the relevant measure of family planning program, Column 5 gives the effect size relative to fertility level at baseline, Column 6 reports the overall change in fertility observed during the period of study, and Column 7 reports the implied percent of the overall fertility decline explained by family planning.
